proportionality, Justice Kennedy did not suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that his analysis would have led to a different outcome in Solem. Accordingly, we conclude that Solem remains good law after Harmelin, recognizing that we need not consider Solem's second and third factors if we conclude under the first factor that a defendant's sentence does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality to the crime. Id. at 1005 ("This conclusion neither `eviscerate[s]' Solem, nor `abandon[ s]' its second and third factors, as the dissent charges . . . ."). See also Henderson, 258 F.3d 706 (citing Solem throughout the opinion for binding points of law).

B. Application of Supreme Court Case Law

Following the revised three-factor test, we first compare Andrade's punishment to his crimes. Because this comparison leads to an "inference of gross disproportionality," we then proceed to compare Andrade's sentence to sentences imposed for other crimes in California and then to sentences imposed for similar crimes in other jurisdictions.

1. Comparison of Punishment and Crime

a. Harshness of the Penalty

Andrade was sentenced to two consecutive indeterminate sentences of 25 years to life in prison. Because of a unique feature of the Three Strikes law, the sentencing judge had no discretion to impose the sentences concurrently. Cal. Penal Code �� 667(c)(6), 1170.12(a)(6); Ingram , 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264.¹⁹ Unlike most sentences imposed under California's sen-

¹⁹The dissent stresses the fact that Andrade's sentence is for two offenses rather than one. There is no dispute that Andrade was convicted of two petty theft offenses with a prior. However, as noted above, California's Three Strikes law precluded the trial judge from exercising any sentencing discretion; the court was required to impose consecutive sentences. The cases cited by the dissent are distinguishable, as it does not

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